



Universities, the media and attempts at ANC control

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Political factionalism, business risks and the ANC’s hybrid regime]*

Pressures on the autonomy of universities

The non-pluralist political culture of the ANC, which does not differentiate between party and state, is unlikely to respect the autonomy of universities and academic dissenting views. In September 2014, President Zuma spoke at the Progressive Professionals Forum and called on South Africa’s universities to become incubators for “patriotic citizens”.¹ As indicated by the political scientist Nicola de Jager, “patriotism” has become a code word to inhibit criticism of the ANC, while critics are often smeared as being non-patriotic.²

The former minister for Higher Education and Training, Blade Nzimande, also is the leader of the SACP. History is very present in Nzimande’s speeches. In a speech in 2007, he referred to “The pessimists, those who lost their will to struggle with the collapse of the Berlin Wall”. His conclusion was different: “It is possible (and imperative) to press ahead with the socialist-oriented transformation in the present right now”.³ It is not clear whether the ANC government sent congratulations to the German government during the twenty-fifth anniversary celebrations of German re-unification on 9 November 2014.⁴

The ANC government has created a legal base for extending the ANC’s capture of state institutions to universities. In 1999, the minister was given the power to appoint administrators under his direct authority to replace university councils and vice-chancellors for a period of two years. In 2000, he was given the power to veto

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1. <http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2014/09/08/zuma-patriotism-and-the-nationalist-threat-to-independent-thought>.
 2. http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_10560-1522-2-30.pdf?070328103113, pp 15, 25.
 3. Blade Nzimande, “Dual power – The living legacy of the Great October Revolution” at <https://www.amadlandawonye.wikispaces.com>.
 4. On the current frosty relations with Britain, see “Zuma’s smoke and mirrors are his own worst enemy”, *Rand Daily Mail*, 3 November 2014; Dennis Worrall, “President Zuma, you have to do better”, *Polity*, 3 November 2014.

agreements entered into by universities. In 2002, he was given the power to amend the institutional statute of a university in certain circumstances; and in 2012, he was given the power to appoint an assessor, instead of or even as well as, an administrator, with extensive powers over universities.

In 2016, the Cabinet and Parliament approved the Higher Education Amendment Draft Bill. This new law increased the powers of the minister of Higher Education, at the time Blade Nzimande, replaced in die 2017 cabinet reshuffle by Professor Hlengiwe Buhle Mkhize, to intervene in university matters of various kinds.⁵ Existing education legislation already enables the minister to issue legally binding “directives” to universities and appoint administrators to take over their management. However, to do this, she is required to provide proof, for example through audit reports, that the university has problems to warrant suspending its independence.

The new legislation allows the minister to change processes and mandates of universities and other higher education institutions and also empowers the minister to withhold funding. According to one clause, the minister would need only to have “reason to believe”, rather than concrete proof, that intervention is necessary. Years of creeping control by the state could well endanger the existence of an independent public university sector.⁶ In October 2016, Nzimande (then still minister of Higher Education) even said private universities posed a serious threat to the public education sector.⁷

Universities whose students come from communities that largely support opposition parties will face the greatest threat to autonomy in the next few years. There has been a focused effort, for example, to weaken the position of Afrikaans and Afrikaans speakers at certain schools. Similar political pressures, combined with economic pressures, have resulted in new university language policies in the past year. These policies weakened or removed Afrikaans as a medium of instruction – despite its officially equal constitutional position and significant numbers of students demanding Afrikaans instruction – at the University of South Africa, the University of Pretoria, the University of the Free State, and the University of Stellenbosch.

There are also efforts to increase the ANC government’s control over these institutions and their discourses. This campaign has been noticeable, since many of these schools and universities were working well, while the government did not really undertake a

5. Also see Department of Education and Training, “Higher Education Act, 1997: Publication of explanatory summary of the Higher Education Amendment Bill, 2015”, *Government Gazette*, 605(39384), 9 November 2015.

6. “Bill giving state more say over varsities passed”, *Business Day*, 25 May 2016; <http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/controversial-higher-education-amendment-bill-passed-2025767>.

7. <http://www.businesslive.co.za/news/latest-news/2016-10-13-private-universities-pose-a-threat-to-public-education/>.

concerted effort to also improve the majority of other less functional schools and universities in the country where education is in crisis.⁸

Rebellious constituencies

The biggest student protests to hit South Africa since 1994 erupted in October 2015. The students had rejected an earlier government offer to cap the increase of study fees at 6%, down from the 10% to 12% proposed by the management of universities. The demonstrations, often involving intimidation and violence, closed some of the country's top universities. Songs were sung, placards raised and entrances to campuses barricaded with burning tyres.⁹ Protests at Parliament in Cape Town turned violent and subsequently the police used stun grenades and water cannons to stop a group of students breaking into the Union Buildings, the seat of government in Pretoria.¹⁰ Vandalism and arson destroyed buildings and facilities, creating millions of rand in damage. After an arson incident at the University of KwaZulu-Natal in September 2016, firefighters managed to bring the fire under control, but the faculty had lost priceless material, including rare books dating back to the foundations of modern-day South African law in the seventeenth century.¹¹

The surface reasons were clear. The ANC government has invested much more generously in secondary than in tertiary education over the past two decades. About 12% of the education budget goes to tertiary institutions, compared to 20% elsewhere in Africa. The government allowed university numbers to double in less than 20 years while underfunding the sector. As a result, real per capita funding of tertiary education has dropped by 30%. The cost of servicing tertiary institutions thus shifted incrementally towards those trying to get into them in the form of rising student fees.

However, some analysts see a political logic behind this government policy. Investment in secondary education is an investment in political loyalty; it keeps influential organisations such as the South African Democratic Teachers Union (SADTU) supportive of the ANC. In contrast, investment in the tertiary sector seems

8. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-11-16-ucts-law-programme-under-existential-threat/#.WoEL6UxuLIU>.

9. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34618724>; <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21677252-anc-faces-perhaps-its-biggest-challenge-yet-boiling-over>; <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/south-african-police-use-stun-grenades-as-students-protesting-tuition-hikes/article26901219/>; <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/21/riot-police-tear-gas-student-protest-south-africa-university-fees-cape-town>; <http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/27/africa/fees-must-fall-student-protest-south-africa-explainer/>; <http://sa-monitor.com/south-africa-barriers-entry-financial-times-25-october-2015/#more-5095>.

10. <http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/education/2015/10/23/police-fire-stun-grenades-as-tensions-run-high-at-union-buildings>; <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34618724>.

11. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ukzn-south-africa-university-protests-nazi-style-library-book-burning-rape-brutality-a7230296.html>.

an investment in critical and independent opposition voices among the black urban middle class.

The political order, with its increase in service delivery protests, is becoming more, rather than less, polarized among the young urban middle class. The ANC leadership is increasingly being discredited by scandals and corruption, selective patronage is obvious, and the economy is unable to improve youth unemployment. Discursive shifts towards assertive black identity politics and radical economic restructuring have occurred among black middle class youth.

They blame small group actors in a narrative that portrays the latter to be big and powerful. “This is just the tip of the iceberg,” says Sinabo Mnqonoiwa, a 27-year-old postgraduate student at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg. “There’s no Rainbow Nation – it’s on paper, we are all free on paper”.¹² While scapegoat politics and resentment surfaces, they ignore the agency of the ANC to improve conditions and the ANC’s accountability for corrupt and ineffective governance.

As predicted, the ANC has tried to instrumentalize the waves of student protests in its effort to strengthen its hold on universities. Zuma announced free higher-education for students from poor households in December 2017. This ignored the views of the Treasury, the recommendations of the Zuma-appointed Heher Commission and of the Davis Tax Committee.

Several European academics who have with extensive interaction with South African universities are very sceptical of the financial ability of most universities to deal with such a policy. PricewaterhouseCoopers’ head of national tax technical, Kyle Mandy, says that South Africans are already looking at R30 billion in tax increases to fill existing tax-revenue shortfalls. In terms of current proposals for higher education, the funding needed for 2018 alone amounts to an additional R12 billion and will escalate to about R50 billion over the next three to four years.¹³

Zuma’s announcement could lead to a new round of protests as political parties either use it to gain an advantage over the ANC or students fight to ensure it is implemented.¹⁴ Even if it fails in co-opting these student groups at certain

12. <http://www.bdlive.co.za/opinion/columnists/2015/10/30/pushing-university-funding-not-in-anc-interest>; <http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2015/10/24/Sanef-concerned-about-intimidation-of-journalists-during-FeesMustFall>; <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-12-05-op-ed-the-politics-of-spectacle-reflections-on-the-2016-student-protests/#.WmO1IqjibIW>.

13. <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/education/2018-01-22-analysis-populist-policies-make-the-road-even-rougher-for-south-africa/>.

14. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-01-09-feeshavefallen-but-uncertainty-casts-doubt-on-universities/#.WmOZmqjibIV>.

universities, both top-down and bottom-up political forces will increase pressure on the autonomy of universities in the near and medium term.

Failed education policies

Statistics South Africa's research paints a bleak picture of failing policy interventions, particularly in education and youth employment. The percentage of black African professional, managerial and technical workers aged 25 to 34 has dropped by 2% over the past 20 years, leaving this generation less skilled than their parents – and less skilled than every other race and age group, according to Statistics South Africa. “When parents are better equipped than the children, it's a sign of regression,” said former Statistician-General Pali Lehohla.¹⁵

Despite pockets of excellence, the quality and work ethic of too many South Africans are pretty poor. All attempts to improve the standards at schools are countered by SADTU, which is allied to the ANC. It has been behind “widespread” corruption and abuse. This included teachers paying union officials for plum jobs, and positions being sold for sex, stock or money. The government has done little in response. Perhaps this is unsurprising; most of the senior civil servants running education are SADTU members.¹⁶

The Economist commented:

Government procurement at all levels is now riddled with graft. Start with schools. Corruption Watch, an NGO, says it has received more than 1 000 reports over the past few years relating to crooked school principals, many of whom have been stealing cash from their school's bank accounts or looting funds intended to feed hungry children. Their jobs are now so lucrative that they are worth killing for. In 2015 one head teacher was hacked to death and another was shot after they refused to make way for people who had “bought” their posts. Officials of the teachers' union have also been implicated in selling posts.¹⁷

Judith February, previously executive director of the Democracy and Governance Unit of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) and also head of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (Idasa) South African Governance Division, stated in 2018 that:

15. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-04-18-the-great-reversal-stats-sa-claims-black-youth-are-less-skilled-than-their-parents/#.WFeu3o9OLIU>.

16. <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21713858-why-it-bottom-class-south-africa-has-one-worlds-worst-education>; “Nzimande's power grab”, *Business Day*, 12 May 2016.

17. “The hollow state”, *The Economist*, 20 December 2015.

South African pupils have done abysmally in global rankings for the Trends in International Maths and Science Study (TIMMS), and even more distressing is that our Grade 4 pupils are unable to ‘read for meaning’. South Africa scored the lowest of 50 countries in the Progress in International Reading and Literacy Study (PIRLS). For any other government committed to the wellbeing of its citizens and economic growth, this would have been a crisis. For the Zuma government it was business as usual ...¹⁸

About 6% of South Africa’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is spent on education, compared to the average of 4.8% in EU countries. In 2017, South Africa allocated R240 billion, at 17.5%, the largest single portion of its budget, to basic education. Yet in January 2017, *The Economist* contended, “South Africa has one of the world’s worst education systems.”

ANC decision-makers in northern provinces of South Africa have now started using access to schools to respond to other popular frustrations with non-delivery and as a red herring to divert attention from its bad educational policies. In the process, especially middle-class and Afrikaans schools, whose parents do not constitute a key constituency for the ANC, are being targeted.

Frans Cronje, president of the liberal thinktank, the IRR, has stated:

Denying a child the chance of a bright future will drive any parent to extreme levels of anger. Politicians who, with good reason, are afraid of the consequences, especially in a politically vulnerable province like Gauteng, would rather that parents did not come to focus on things like below 50% pass rates in maths. Hence the effort made to focus public anger on other issues such as racism and Afrikaans. The political formula is easy: make some outrageous allegation based on a sliver of truth and appeal to the media’s bent for the pitiful drama put into motion when the most reptilian of politicians conspire through half-truths and populist incitement to turn two fundamentally decent but equally desperate racial or ethnic communities against each other and threaten violent disorder. Ferry in a crowd of protesters, make sure some wet-behind-the-ears click-bait focused junior journalist fresh out of media school is there with his or her cellphone to draw the voyeuristic public into the wretched scenes of the desperate parents fighting for the chance that their children might go to a good school. Then bring out the riot police, and you are assured of

18. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2018-01-09-on-freedom-fact-and-falsehood/#.WmOb16jibIV>.

*another week of not having to answer tough questions about the schools your department runs.*¹⁹

It is expected that populist agitation against some middle-class and Afrikaans schools will continue. This may result in serious flashpoints in the few next years. Many in the ANC will try to benefit from it politically.

Media freedom under pressure

In post-1994 South Africa, press freedom is guaranteed by Section 16 of the Bill of Rights. Together with parts of the judiciary, the media has been considered to be one of the most important remaining checks on the power of the ruling party, since the ANC government has largely neutralized other potentially independent watchdog institutions through its policy of cadre deployment and other measures such as intimidation.

However, it is important also to scrutinise the de facto realities of media freedom in South Africa.²⁰ The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) is the country's public broadcaster.²¹ It controls most television and radio broadcasting in South Africa.

The ANC has used cadre deployment to align the state broadcaster with the ruling party. During the 2014 elections, the SABC was criticised for refusing to air the campaign adverts of two main opposition parties, namely the DA and the EFF.²² As stated by Nicola de Jager, political scientist at the University of Stellenbosch:

*Reporters, analysts and others within the public broadcaster who are considered to operate out of line are slowly moved out, examples include Eusebius McKaiser and John Perlman.*²³

The 2017 Freedom House report concludes:

Nonetheless, concerns about press freedom have grown in recent years amid increasing government pressure on both state-run and independent outlets. A number of recent incidents have compromised the credibility and independence of the SABC, the outlet with the largest reach in the

19. <https://www.news24.com/Columnists/GuestColumn/gauteng-education-departments-master-class-in-delusion-20180123>.

20. <http://www.r2k.org.za/>; <http://fxi.org.za/home/>.

21. http://www.sabc.co.za/wps/portal/SABC/SABCARTICLE?id=5c5fc9804c9afedb8cbcff39f3bc9014&page_from=CSI.

22. <http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2014/04/22/sabc-bans-eff-advert---video>;
<http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2014/04/30/da-cries-political-censorship-as-sabc-refuses-to-air-second-advert>.

23. http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_10054.pdf.

country. The most high-profile incident came in May (2016), when the SABC banned the broadcast of violent protests taking place across the country. The broadcaster's controversial chief operating officer, Hlaudi Motsoeneng – a political ally of Zuma – said it was the role of the SABC to “educate the citizens”, and that coverage of the unrest could encourage further violence. Critics of the ban alleged that the broadcaster had enacted it in order to avoid unflattering coverage for the ANC in the run-up to the August local elections. Amid protests against the ban from journalists, civil society, and the opposition, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) ordered its reversal in July.

Seven SABC journalists and one contracted freelance journalist were fired by the SABC in July after criticizing the protest ban policy. The journalists were reinstated later in the month following a ruling by the Labour Court in Johannesburg. In June, Motsoeneng reportedly directed SABC staff not to engage in tough questioning of Zuma or to cover him negatively.²⁴

Witnesses testifying in December 2016 before Parliament's ad hoc committee investigating the SABC, painted a picture of intimidation, death threats, ministerial interference, secret meetings, as well as a cult-like worship that surrounded Motsoeneng.²⁵ SABC news had become tainted, with politicians, including Communications Minister Faith Muthambi, constantly dictating how journalists should cover certain stories, according to Thandeka Gqubule, one of the eight abovementioned fired journalists, known as the “SABC eight”.²⁶ The SSA played a role in what was described as a climate of fear and intimidation at the SABC. Top SABC finance officials testified how Motsoeneng secretly used SSA officials to find incriminating evidence on his opponents so that he could dismiss them from the SABC.²⁷ Journalists stated that during the 2014 elections, they were told that 70% of their coverage of the government had to be positive.

John Matisonn, author of *God, Lies & Spies*, notes:

24. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2017/south-africa>.

25. “SABC inquiry: Who's Hlaudi's Godfather, members ask witnesses”, *Daily Maverick*, 11 December 2016; <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/how-hlaudi-sold-the-sabc-20161211-3>; <http://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2016-12-10-politics-live-wherever-there-is--zumas-corporate-hatchet-man/>; <http://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/media/2016-12-09-faith-muthambi-forced-hlaudi-on-sabc/>.

26. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2016-12-12-sabcmotsoeneng-coup-ad-hoc-committee-wants-minister-of-state-security/#.WE-X5eZ97IV>; <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/media/2016-12-13-sabc-eight-detail-hlaudi-motsoenengs-reign-of-terror/>.

27. <https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/media/2016-12-23-secret-purge-hlaudi-motsoenengs-dirty-war-at-sabc/>.

*There's a great deal of evidence from SABC journalists who've spoken out and say they have been very, very greatly intimidated by the leadership in the corporation, and even by people in government who have told them directly: Don't antagonise the president or don't write about this. Don't broadcast about that. And so there were plenty of reasons for him [Zuma] to feel intimidated ...*²⁸

Private newspapers and magazines are often critical of powerful figures and institutions and remain a crucial check on the government. However, government allies own a growing share of independent media. In August 2013, Independent News and Media was bought by Sekunjalo, a company which belongs to the pro-ANC Iqbal Survé. Money for the deal came from the state-run civil service pension fund, 25% directly, and almost 45% in the form of a loan to Survé. Two Chinese state-run companies provided 20% of the remaining funding.²⁹

Due to cadre deployment to the regulatory body, ICASA, it has failed to ensure the non-partisan nature of the SABC.³⁰ Allegations have emerged about ANC attempts to also influence the commercial eTV television service.³¹ In February 2015 a SABC memorandum of incorporation emerged that gave the minister of Communications the power to discipline and remove executive managers and board members at the SABC. Before the emergence of the memorandum, SABC board members could be removed through a parliamentary process only.³²

Potential for internet censorship

The Film and Publications Board (FPB) gazetted a Draft Online Regulation Policy document on 4 March 2015. In terms of this, everything published on the internet could be subjected to classification from the FPB. Anyone wishing to publish or distribute content would first have to apply for a digital publisher's online distribution agreement with the FPB, which would require a subscription fee. Once paid, the publisher would have to submit the content to the FPB for classification prior to publishing.

This effectively constitutes a form of pre-publication censorship, which would undermine the internet's immediacy. The regulations would also allow the FPB to

28. <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/listeningpost/2017/02/state-media-zuma-south-africa-170218113247808.html>.

29. R.W. Johnson, *How long will South Africa survive? The looming crisis* (Jonathan Ball Publishers, Cape Town, 2015), pp 132-135.

30. Prinola Govenden, "Toothless regulator?" *A critical analysis of ICASA's regulation of the SABC so that it functions as a public service broadcaster* (University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2009).

31. <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2014-10-30-op-ed-minister-patel-and-encas-feel-good-documentaries/#.VFkHgst0y71>.

32. <http://sa-monitor.com/minister-defends-sabc-secrecy-times-live-18-march-2015/#more-3351>.

“dispatch classifiers to the distributors’ premises for the purposes of classifying digital content”. Distributors would have to “ensure that the work of classifiers takes place unhindered and without interference”.³³

In March 2017, the then State Security Minister Mahlobo announced that government was contemplating new regulations to better regulate social media in South Africa.³⁴ The bill is heading for Parliament.³⁵

In international forums, the ANC government has not opposed internet censorship. In March 2015, Germany and Brazil spearheaded a UN resolution calling for a UN special rapporteur on privacy. The resolution affirmed the right to privacy in the digital age and expressed deep concern at:

... the negative impact that surveillance and/or interception of communications, including extraterritorial surveillance and/or interception of communications, as well as the collection of personal data, in particular when carried out on a mass scale, may have on the exercise and enjoyment of human rights.

The rapporteur would be appointed for three years to gather information on privacy-related matters and practice, and report on violations of the right to privacy. South Africa and Saudi Arabia opposed the resolution. In addition, in March 2014, South Africa led a group including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia in proposing amendments to water down the right to peaceful protest.³⁶

Strained relations between the ANC and critical journalists

Although no serious incidents regarding government authorisation to actively target journalists have been reported, the ANC’s relationship with the media is generally strained. Van Onselen distinguishes between several phases in the relations. After coming to power in 1994, the ideals of a free and independent press were championed and celebrated. However, the dynamics of governance, mismanagement and corruption resulted in deterioration of media relations and the proposal of a media tribunal. Through the state and pro-ANC private capital, a series of existing and new media were remodelled and established, generally to be more “positive” about and “supportive” of the government of the day.³⁷

33. <http://mybroadband.co.za/news/internet/121528-stop-internet-censorship-in-south-africa.html>.

34. <https://businesstech.co.za/news/internet/162547/south-africas-3-new-proposed-censorship-laws-you-need-to-know-about/>.

35. <https://www.itweb.co.za/content/kxA9PO7NmAOvo4J8>.

36. <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-03-29-analysis-whats-south-africas-anti-human-rights-game-at-the-un/#.VXbzdssR672>.

37. <http://sa-monitor.com/devolution-ancs-trust-media-bdlive-21-september-2016/>.

Communications Minister Faith Muthambi told MPs in April 2015 that they needed to take further action on the issue of a regulatory system for the print media so that they could achieve the meaningful transformation agenda of the country. ANC spokesperson Zizi Kodwa confirmed in 2015 that the ANC was sticking to its 2007 resolution to call for a state-controlled media appeals tribunal to regulate the media.³⁸ At the ANC conference in December 2017, the governing party resolved that its “parliamentarians must have enquired whether a media appeals tribunal is feasible”.³⁹

There has been an increase in direct attacks on journalists. These incidents have included police harassment of reporters across the country. They have been subject to wrongful or illegal arrest, forced to delete photographs or barred from entering particular spaces. In February 2015, the SSA confirmed handing Mpumalanga premier and new ANC deputy president David Mabuza intelligence reports on the lives and movements of journalists in the province.⁴⁰

In 2017, the South African National Editors’ Forum (Sanef) expressed alarm at moves by police to investigate journalists Jacques Pauw and Pieter-Louis Myburgh, who have both reported extensively on President Zuma’s alleged corrupt dealings. Media Monitoring Africa’s William Bird said the reports indicated the politicization of the police, especially being used by certain people for their own agendas. Bird said it was a clear and present threat to media freedom, but also a clear attempt to undermine the credibility of the journalists.⁴¹

Lizette Rabie, professor of Journalism at the University of Stellenbosch, has indicated that the alarm bells are ringing.⁴² Threats against media freedom are already so severe that a comparison could be drawn between the media (un)freedom under NP government during a period of internal conflict and that under a peacetime ANC government.⁴³

The most critical media sometimes reflect an Anglo-centric and pro-capitalist focus. To be very fair to President Zuma, the journalists of these media may not always understand or try to understand politics from his vantage point: the frameworks of

38. <http://www.news24.com/Archives/City-Press/Government-moots-return-of-dreaded-media-tribunal-20150429>; <http://www.enca.com/south-africa/zuma-takes-swipe-media-over-xenophobia-covera>.

39. <https://mg.co.za/article/2018-01-10-what-to-expect-in-parliament-in-2018>.

40. <http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-04-28-op-ed-world-press-freedom-day-2015-sa-edition/#.VUDBT5UcTIX>. Also see <http://sa-monitor.com/south-africa-process-much-open-abuse-htxt-africa-29-april-2015/#more-3720>.

41. <https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2017-12-06-editors-forum-concerned-over-threats-to-arrest-jacques-pauw-and-news24-journalist/#.Wi92i0qWbIV>.

42. See L. Rabie, “Media freedom in South Africa: A luta continua?”, *South African Monitor*, (5), November 2015, pp 97-102.

43. P.J. Fourie, “’n Terugkeer na die onderdrukking van vryheid van spraak? Ooreenkomste tussen die apartheidsregering(s) en die ANC se optrede teen die media”, *Tydskrif vir Geesteswetenskappe*, 49(1), 2009, pp 62-84.

many Zulu men of his generation and socio-economic background; his political socialization as a young man and later as the military intelligence head of a guerrilla force in a brutalizing struggle; the complex requirements of his political survival in a hybrid regime.

Still, the media and various actors from civil society have played an important role in maintaining the constitutional space for freedom of the media and expression against ANC pressure. It is clear that the ruling party will continue to be suspicious when it comes to media entities that do not align themselves with ANC objectives and policies.⁴⁴ The space for freedom of the media will continue to be under pressure in the hybrid regime. Both self-censorship and more independent investigative journalism by citizens and business may be the result.

The impact of the media on changing political dynamics should however not be overestimated. If the media uncovers questionable conduct by ANC politicians, it depends firstly on the ANC and its factions how it would respond to the revelations. The ANC's support of Zuma, even in the face of considerable scandals, indicates how strong a role the fear of losing jobs and access to resources can play. These dynamics limit the impact of the media and reinforce the hybrid regime. ■

44. Also see Susan Booyen, *Dominance and Decline: The ANC in the time of Zuma* (Wits University Press, Johannesburg, 2015), p 309.